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The Persistence of Colonial Constitutionalism in 
British Overseas Territories   
 
Hakeem O. Yusuf *and Tanzil Chowdhury** 
 
Abstract: This article argues that despite the UK Government’s exaltations of self-
determination of its Overseas Territories, provisions of colonial governance persist in 
their constitutions. Further, it posits that such illustrations begin to answer the broader 
question of whether British Overseas Territories (BOTs) are modern day colonies. Such 
claims are not without merit given that 10 out of the 14 BOTS are still considered Non-
Self-Governing Territories by the United Nations and have remained the target of 
decolonisation efforts. Drawing insights from post-colonial legal theory, this article 
develops the idea of the persistence of colonial constitutionalism to interrogate whether 
structural continuities exist in the governance of the UK’s British Overseas Territories. 
The analysis begins to unravel the fraught tensions between constitutional provisions 
that advance greater self-determination and constitutional provisions that maintain the 
persistence of colonial governance. Ultimately, the post-colonial approach foregrounds 
a thoroughgoing analysis on whether BOTs are colonies and how such an exegesis 
would require particular nuance that is largely missing in current institutional and non- 
institutional articulations of, as well as representations on, the issue.  
 
Keywords: British Overseas Territories; Colonies; Constitutionalism; Post-Colonial 
Theory; Self-Determination   
 
‘...The maximum of self-government within the Empire at the earliest practicable time’. 
- Colonel Oliver Stanley, Secretary of State for the Colonies1 
 
I. Introduction  
The governance and day-to-day life in the various British Overseas Territories (BOTs) 
do not arouse images of ‘a distant outpost lorded over by white foreigners who deprive 
local inhabitants of self-government and extract immense riches for their own profit’.2 
                                                          
*Reader in Global Legal Studies, Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham 
** Lecturer in Public Law, School of Law, Queen Mary University of London. This is the Accepted 
Manuscript of this article. The final version is available at: 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/global-constitutionalism/latest-issue  
1 ‘Home News British Aims in the Colonies; Progress to Self-Government’, (The Times, London, 20th March 
1945) 
<http://find.galegroup.com.manchester.idm.oclc.org/ttda/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=TTDA&us
erGroupName=jrycal5&tabID=T003&docPage=article&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&docId=CS337
67540&type=multipage&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0> (emphasis added) 
2 R Aldrich, J Connell, The Last Colonies (CUP, Cambridge, 1998) 3 
Despite the diminution of that imagery, the persistence of colonial governance and the 
broader question: ‘are British Overseas Territories (BOTs) colonies?’, has remained a 
critical issue in constitutional law, international law and international relations. Ten of 
the fourteen BOTs are on the UN’s List of Non-Self-Governing Territories, have been so 
since 1946 and are the target of decolonisation efforts by the UN.  
Notwithstanding stated commitments to self-determination by the Government of the 
United Kingdom in relation to its BOTs,3 their status remains contested. Indeed, the 
issue of the status of the BOTs has featured prominently in a number of recent policy 
statements, commentary and judicial determinations. Testimony to their unsettled 
nature was most recently highlighted in the Bashir litigation4 and Bancoult (No 2)5 
through the exacting of the ‘new political status’ test that considered, for the purposes 
of determining the  (non) application of international treaties to which the United 
Kingdom had been party to, whether BOTs were continuations of the colonies from 
which they emerged. Further, the recent Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, 
which requires BOTs to create public registers of all businesses registered there, was 
described by the Chief Minister of Gibraltar as an ‘unacceptable act of modern day 
colonialism’.6 In addition, settling the status-question of the BOTs has taken on new 
significance following the 2016 referendum on the UK’s membership of the European 
Union (Brexit)7 as it raises the issue of the future relation of the BOTs with the EU and 
possibly with the UK.    
While self-determination underpins the UK Government’s position toward its Overseas 
Territories,8 questions remain as to the nature of substantive reforms in the 
constitutional configurations of the BOTs. Nowhere was this more acutely felt than in 
the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), where the UK Government forcibly expelled 
the Chagossian inhabitants for the purposes of leasing the territory to the United States 
to establish a military base.9 Two characterisations of the UK in this episode, as an 
‘empire striking back’10 or an ‘empire all over again’,11 had particularly strong 
resonances of the persistence of colonial or imperial power. Further, in 2009, following 
                                                          
3 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Partnership for Progress and Prosperity: Britain and the Overseas 
Territories (White Paper, Cm 4264 1999); Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Overseas Territories: 
Security, Success and Sustainability (White Paper, Cm 8374 2012) 
4 R (on application of Tag Eldin Ramadan Bashir & Other) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2016] EWHC 954 (Admin); R (on application of Tag Eldin Ramadan Bashir & Other) v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 397; R (on application of Tag Eldin Ramadan Bashir & Other) v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 45 
5 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Bancoult (No 2) [2008] UKHL 61 
6 HM Government of Gibraltar, ‘Press Release: Letter from Chief Minister to Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell MP’ 1 
May 2018 available at 
<https://www.gibraltar.gov.gi/new/sites/default/files/press/2018/Press%20Releases/242.3-
2018.pdf>   
7 HM Government, The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union (Cm 9417 
2017) 20 
8 See (n 3) 
9 See (n 5) 
10 P Sand, ‘R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Bancoult (No 2)’ 103 AJIL 317, 
320 
11 HO Yusuf, Colonial and Post-Colonial Constitutionalism in the Commonwealth: Peace, Order and Good 
Government (Routledge, Abingdon, 2014) 161-192 
a full scale inquiry12 into alleged corruption in the Turks and Caicos Islands, the UK 
Government introduced the Turks and Caicos Islands Constitution (Interim Amendment) 
Order 200913 which suspended parts of the Overseas Territory’s constitution and 
established interim, direct rule from Westminster, through the Governor, until the 
government of the territory had addressed the corruption issues.  
 
The constitutional provisions governing the relationship between the UK metropole and 
BOTs enabled the above and similar interventions which looked remarkably like 
colonial style governance to take place. This however oversimplifies a far more 
complicated extant picture. Many of the BOTs have high-levels of self-government, 
thriving economies, voted to maintain particular configurations of British Sovereignty 
through referenda and co-produced political conventions that de facto establish greater 
parity between them and the UK. Thus, the status-question of the BOTs presents a 
complexity that is arguably not replicated elsewhere.   
 
This article is intended as a prolegomenon of a post-colonial approach to BOT 
constitutionalism by beginning to unpack the complexity in the determination of 
whether or not BOTs are modern-day colonies. It does this by drawing insights from 
post-colonial theory, in particular, the scholarship focussing on the continuity or 
‘persistence of the colonial’.14 While the persistence of colonial power can be articulated 
and identified at the international law level, the global political-economy level, and the 
domestic level, this article adopts a legalist approach and focuses on the domestic level, 
specifically, the operative role of constitutionalism in maintaining or abating continuing 
colonial governance. Post-colonial theory is particularly illuminating as a framework for 
analysis as it reveals the subtle and often elusive nature of provisions of colonial 
governance that this article argues still exists in the governance of BOTs.  
 
The article first examines the imprimatur that Britain is ‘post-colonial’; a claim that 
largely refers to a cessation in imperial and colonial governance.15 This section also 
focuses that claim with reference to the BOTs, providing an overview of the common 
constitutional provisions that distinguish them as such, the UK Government’s policy 
orientations on the BOTs, and the general reception of the BOTs at the United Nations. 
                                                          
12 Robin Auld, Turks and Caicos Islands Commission of Inquiry (19 December 2013) 27, available at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/turks-and-caicos-islands-commission-of-inquiry-2008-
2009> 
13 <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/701/contents/made> 
14 E Darian-Smith and Peter Fitzpatrick, (eds), Laws of the Postcolonial (University of Michigan Press, 
Michigan, 1999); A Roy, ‘Postcolonial Theory and Law: A Critical Introduction’ (2008) 29 Adelaide Law 
Review 1, 315 
15 This is of course, contingent on what constitutes Colonial/Imperial power. See also R Young, 
Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction (Blackwell, Sussex, 2001) 13-70 
The next part presents the theoretical framework for analysis, which draws from a 
particular stratum of post-colonial legal theory, the ‘Persistence of the Colonial’.16 This 
challenges the presumption of the ‘Westphalian break’17  that makes the descriptive 
claim of a cessation of colonialism and imperial power. Rather, this article argues that 
there is a structural continuity in the fabric of the post-colonial state from the imperial 
era which is reflected in the persistence of colonial constitutionalism. It then critically 
examines a small number of BOT constitutions with this conceptual framework to 
interrogate the tensions between colonial- and self-government. While the focus is 
levelled on a few BOTs, in particular Gibraltar, it is hoped that this article provides a 
point of departure for a more holistic and thorough analysis of all BOTS in the future.  
 
II. Post-Colonial Britain? The United Kingdom and Her (British) Overseas 
Territories 
Empire and post-colonialism 
Colonialism is one particular articulation and rendering of imperial power. As Edward 
Said explains, imperialism refers to ‘the practice, theory, and the attitudes of a 
dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory’18 though debates continue as 
to whether the compulsion was economistic, cultural or both.19 As part of the typology 
of imperialism,20 colonialism was initially ‘pragmatic and until the nineteenth century 
generally developed locally in a haphazard way’. 21 Establishing colonies were either for 
settlement or the exploitation of natural resources22 and were usually vindicated by 
alarmist- though often empirically wanting- discourses of Malthusian logics of over-
population, scarcity of resources and civilising narratives. With regard to the BOTs in 
particular, a common justification for their acquisition was the defence imperative. As 
Sir Ivor Jennings observed, ‘England acquired an Empire because her life was on the 
ocean wave; having an Empire, she found that her battle-line was more than ever the 
deep…Gibraltar, Malta, St. Helena…became units in a vast scheme of the protection of 
the lines of communication.’23 
UK colonial law similarly reflected this irregular process by recognising four different 
methods in which territories were ‘acquired’ -as it was euphemistically referred to24- 
settlement, conquest, cession or annexation. The method of acquisition was determined 
                                                          
16 See (n 14) 89-144  
17 N Berman, ‘In the Wake of Empire’ (1999) 14 American University International Law Review 1531 
18 E Said, Culture and Imperialism (Chatto and Windus, London, 1993) 8 
19  B Ashcroft, G Griffiths and H Tiffin, Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies (Routledge, Oxford, 1998) 126; 
See also A Loomba, Colonialism/Postcolonialism (Routledge, London, 2015) 19-39 
20 See (n 15) 25 
21 Ibid. at 16 
22 Ibid. See also Jürgen Osterhammel, Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview, trans. Shelley L Frisch. 
(Princeton, New Jersey 1997) 115 
23 I Jennings The British Commonwealth of Nations (3rd edition Hutchinson’s & Co (Publishers) Ltd 1956) 
115. 
24 I Hendry & S Dickson, British Overseas Territories Law (Hart, Oxford, 2011) 6-9 
by regular practice or by the courts, and once determined, could not be upended.25 As 
two eminent colonial law scholars, Sir Ivor Jennings26 and Arthur Keith27 have pointed 
out, the method was important from the colonial law perspective for establishing which 
law prevailed at the point of acquisition, and the power of the Monarch to legislate for 
the territory.28  
The interrogation of colonialism often dovetails into an ethical debate about the merits 
and demerits of the British Empire- a debate that has been persistent and divisive.29 For 
some, Britain’s imperial past is a spectre that haunts (and taints) what contemporary 
protagonists perceive as its necessary and benevolent role in global affairs. The 
treatment for such resentment is often imperial amnesia that largely forgets the 
systematic transgressions of imperial rule. Others however, revel in the glorious days of 
empire, a nostalgia that lionizes British imperium that ‘developed’ the Global South, 
pulling it out from the dark ages and into the thralls of Enlightenment-fuelled progress.  
At the very least, this camp suggests that Britain ought to ‘moderate our post-imperial 
guilt’.30 What purists from both schools share however, is ‘a distinct temporal marker of 
the colonial process’31 that delineates between the imperial era and contemporary 
‘post-colonial’ politics.  
 
Critics of the temporal marker of the colonial process would suggest that an imperial 
past is a misnomer, for it presupposes that Britain is ex post factum the supposed 
imperium sine fine. The contention here is that the ‘imperial or colonial’,32 persists and 
that this break was either a political fiction or merely a rupture in the expression of a 
particular type of imperial or colonial power. A recent articulation which evidenced this 
persistence appeared in 2017 when Liam Fox, the UK Secretary of State for 
International Trade and Development, called for a boost in trade links with the African 
Commonwealth nations, dubbed ‘Empire 2.0’ by Whitehall officials.33 It is with this; the 
                                                          
25 Christian v R [2006] UKPC 47 
26 I Jennings and C.M Young Constitutional Laws of the Commonwealth (Oxford University Press) 38-46. 
27 AB Keith The Constitution, Administration and Laws of the Empire (W. Collins Sons and Co. Ltd, 1924) 
267-270. 
28 Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowp 204; Sammut v Strickland [1938] AC 678 (PC) 
29W Dahlgreen, ‘The British Empire is ‘something to be proud of’’ (YouGov, 26 July 2014) 
<https://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/07/26/britain-proud-its-empire/>;  
30 The recent debate around British Imperialism and the legacies of its empire were stoked when the 
University of Oxford’s Macdonald Centre announced a 5 year interdisciplinary project on ‘Ethics and 
Empire.’ See also <http://www.mcdonaldcentre.org.uk/ethics-and-empire>. For a rebuttal, see J 
McDougall, E O’Halloran et al., ‘Ethics and empire: an open letter from Oxford Scholars’ (The Conversation, 
19 December 2017) < https://theconversation.com/ethics-and-empire-an-open-letter-from-oxford-
scholars-89333> and K Malik, ‘The Great British Empire Debate’ (New York Review of Books, 26 January 
2018) http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/01/26/the-great-british-empire-debate/; On the 
contemporary relevance of decolonisation, see also T Chowdhury, ‘What is there to Decolonise’ (Pluto 
Press Blog, 26 July 2018) https://www.plutobooks.com/blog/decolonise-rhodes-must-fall/ . G Bhambra, 
D Gebrial, K Nişancıoğlu (eds.) Decolonizing the University (Pluto Press, London, 2018) 
31 L Gandhi, Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction (Columbia University Press, New York, 1998) 3 
32 See (n 15) 15-70 
33 S Coates, ‘Ministers aim to build ‘empire 2.0’ with African Commonwealth (The Times, March 2 2017) 
available at https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/ministers-aim-to-build-empire-2-0-with-african-
persistence of colonialism and the insights it provides as to the constitutionalism of the 
BOTs, that this article is concerned. 
 
The position that Britain is post-colonial therefore claims that the period of imperial 
governance is a relic - politically, economically, socially, culturally and constitutionally - 
of the past. On this view, ‘post-colonial’ Britain is a term which has ‘a clearly 
chronological meaning, designating the post-independence period’34 typically referring 
to the period of rapid European decolonisation in the 1940s and 1950s. The ‘granting’ of 
independence, the creation of the Commonwealth of Nations and the United Nations, 
and the establishment of an international system predicated on sovereign equality 
evidence such a claim.  While pondering the challenge of decolonisation and self-
government in the British Empire at that time, Jennings offered the view that ‘Colonial 
peoples will not be satisfied with less than independence, and the only question may be 
whether it shall be independence inside or outside the British Commonwealth.’35 This 
has, with hindsight, constituted valuable insight.  
British Overseas Territories 
The BOTs are remnants of British colonial and imperial exploits, though none were 
acquired by conquest36 but variations or combinations of cession, settlement and 
annexation. The territories vary in their size, location and population and are 
constitutionally distinct from one another and the UK, having separate constitutions 
that reflect the specificities contingent to the circumstances and challenges confronting 
each territory37 and the ‘complex history of the Empire.’38  For example, some BOTs 
have very small populations39 while others have no permanent population40 and this 
invariably has an effect on the constitutional makeup of the specific BOT.  
 
Some BOTs have high levels of self-government, akin to independent states. In addition, 
many of the BOTs are largely financially independent of the UK. For example, Gibraltar’s 
GDP for 2016/1741 was higher than many Western European nations, in part, due to a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
commonwealth-after-brexit-v9bs6f6z9 ;  M Hardt and A Negri, Empire (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 2000) 
34 See (n 19)186; See also Paul Gilroy, Postcolonial Melancholia (Columbia University Press, New York, 
2006) 
35 See (n 23) 158. 
36 With the possible exception of the Sovereign Base Areas. Also, Gibraltar was initially taken by conquest 
in the Spanish War of Succession but did not transfer into exclusive British hands following that war. It 
was not until 1713 and the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht that the territory was, for the purposes of law, 
ceded to the British from Spain.  
37 See (n 24) 1 
38 See (n 27) 267 
39 Pitcairn Island has a population of just 50 people. Available at <http://www.visitpitcairn.pn/> 
40 British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean Territory, South Georgia and the South Sandwich 
Islands 
41 <https://www.gibraltar.gov.gi/new/key-indicators> 
flourishing tourism and gaming industry.42 The constitutional development of each 
territory therefore has varied. Their continued status as BOTs has been either due to the 
inhabitants’ wishes to remain under the sovereignty of the UK, the non-viability of 
independence, or because of the territories strategic value to the UK.43  
 
However, despite constitutional variances, there are common constitutional features 
that define the BOTs as such.44 For example, though they are not constitutionally a part 
of the United Kingdom, they form part of the ‘Crown’s undivided realm’45 ‘in the sense of 
government, power, ownership and belonging’.46 To this effect, all BOTs have a 
Governor or equivalent as a representative of the Crown. The Governor will often have 
‘special responsibilities’ which allow them to exercise exclusive executive and 
legislative power.47 The Governor therefore ‘is appointed by the Crown, represents the 
Crown, and is responsible to the Crown’.48 BOTs do not have a separate status from the 
UK for the purposes of international relations,49 the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council sits as the apex court for all BOTs and, though unsettled, the Bancoult litigation 
left open the possibility that BOT local laws could be reviewed by UK domestic courts.50 
Further, the UK Parliament retains unlimited power to legislate for the territories51 and 
any reforms to the constitutions of the BOTs require amendment by the UK either 
through an Order in Council or an Act of Parliament.52 Additionally, the domestic laws of 
the BOTs are subject to the ‘repugnancy doctrine’ enacted by the Colonial Laws Validity 
Act 1865 (CLVA), which states that ‘colonial laws’53 are void if they conflict with a UK 
Act of Parliament.54  
 
UK policy toward the BOTs 
In 1997, a root and branch effort to modernise the BOTs commenced under the Labour 
government with the publication of the 1999 White Paper, Partnership for Progress and 
                                                          
42 House of Lords EU Committee, Brexit: Gibraltar (2017, HL 116) 7 
43 For example, two British Overseas Territories- the Sovereign Base Areas and the British Indian Ocean 
Territory- are used exclusively as military bases. Indeed, the former was key to the British invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 and the recent military strikes in Syria in 2015 and 2018. The Falklands Island and Gibraltar 
are examples of territories that have served dual civilian and military functions. 
44 These are developed in the section Colonial Governance: Provisions illustrating the Persistence of 
Colonial Constitutionalism in the BOTs  
45 See (n 5) per Lord Hoffman and (n 24) 23 
46 Tito v. Waddell (No 2) [1977] Ch 106; This was also reaffirmed in Bancoult (No 2) (n 5) 
47 See The Role of the Governor below. 
48 ECS Wade & GG Phillips, Constitutional Law (4th edn, Longmans, Green and Co, London, 1951) 403 
49 The UK retains responsibility under United Nations Charter, Article 73 
50 See (n 11) 161-192 
51 Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke [1969] AC 645 
52 See (n 24) 22-34 
53 See also section Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 and the Interpretation Act 1978 
54 These are all discussed in detail relation to the BOTs. See also Colonial Governance: Provisions 
illustrating the persistence of Colonial Constitutionalism in the BOTs below. 
Prosperity: Britain and the Overseas Territories.55 Its aim was to establish ‘a renewed 
contract between Britain and the Overseas Territories’56 including a reform in its 
constitutional relations.57 The paper set out four principles that sought to inform this 
modernisation process; self-determination, responsibilities and reciprocity, the 
encouragement of self-government and the provision of support for the BOTs in times 
of emergency. Part of this renewal had to do with contingent liabilities arising from the 
UK’s responsibilities for the BOTs’ external affairs under international law, but part also 
from a desire to address and rebalance its relationship with the BOTs. The paper 
concluded that the options of integration into the UK or Crown Dependency status58 
were not appropriate alternatives for the BOTs but that arrangements needed ‘to be 
revisited, reviewed and where necessary revised’.59 It recognised that ‘each Overseas 
Territory is unique and needed a constitutional framework to suit its own 
circumstances’.60 This White Paper may be likened to the BOTs’ equivalent of the 
‘temporal marker’ from imperial governance, though certain territories- such as 
Bermuda- had experienced greater self-government from a far earlier period. In 2001, 
the British Government invited the BOTs to review their constitutions and submit 
proposals.61 In 2002, a shift in Whitehall parlance heralded a legislative change in their 
names from ‘Dependent Territories’, to their current appellation, with a nod to the UK 
Government’s commitment to self-determination.  
 
As recently as 2017, the UK has maintained that self-determination has and continues to 
form the basis of its relationship with all its BOTs. In the most recent annual meeting of 
the Joint Ministerial Council for the Overseas Territories, which gathers heads of the 
BOTs and the UK Government, the communique stated 
 
The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, as enshrined in 
the UN Charter, applies to the peoples of the Overseas Territories. We reaffirmed 
the importance of promoting the right of the peoples of the Territories to self-
determination, a collective responsibility of all parts of the UK Government. …the 
                                                          
55 See (n 3). This was recently reaffirmed in the 2017 meeting of the Joint Ministerial Council for the 
Overseas Territories. See UK Overseas Territories Joint Ministerial Council, ‘2017 Communique’ (Joint 
Ministerial Council, London, 28-29 November 2017) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/663983/Joint_Minist
erial_Council_2017_-_Communique.pdf >  
56 Ibid. 4 
57 See P Clegg & P Gold, ‘The UK Overseas Territories: A decade of progress and prosperity?’ (2011) 49, 1 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 115-135; EW Davies, The Legal Status of British dependent 
Territories: The West Indies and North Atlantic Region (CUP, Cambridge, 1995) 
58 FCO Partnership (n 3) 13 
59 Ibid. 13 
60 Ibid. 13 
61 House of Commons Library Research Paper, Gibraltar: Diplomatic and Constitutional Developments, 
06/48 of 11 October 2006, 22 
UK will continue to support requests for the removal of the Territory from the 
United Nations list of non-self-governing territories62 
It is also salient to note that many of the BOTs have not expressed a wish for 
independence from the UK. Indeed, some, like Bermuda and Gibraltar have often 
articulated this through referenda. There is a larger question which ought to examine 
the reasons for this- ranging from the strategic value of alliances with the UK to stave off 
hostile neighbours (as with Gibraltar and Spain; the Falklands and Argentina), the non-
viability of independence because of a colonial-induced material and political 
dependency on the UK63 (as is the case with the smaller populated BOTs), to the values 
certain BOTs have to British geo-political interests in different parts of the world 
(military bases in Gibraltar, the Sovereign Base Areas and a US military base in the 
BIOT). 
Self-determination and the UN 
Self-Determination64 is the preeminent term in understanding the process toward 
decolonisation. It is mentioned several times in the UN Charter, including Article 1(2), 
which proclaims the ‘respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples’ and Article 55 where it promotes international economic and social co-
operation on the basis of ‘equal rights and self-determination of peoples’. It is also 
recognised in common Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 1966 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
1966.65 Importantly, UN General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) focussed self-
determination as part of the international law applicable to colonized territories (or 
Non-Self-Governing Territories as the UN refers to them as). Thus, it can be understood 
that decolonisation is effected through self-determination. Indeed, in the Namibia 
Advisory Opinion,66 the International Court of Justice held that self-determination 
applied to all peoples in colonial territories and was further recognised as part of 
customary international law in the Western Sahara Case.67 Consistent state practice 
from colonial powers68 and the absence of denial or contrary practice have, for some 
commentators, confirmed69 that self-determination is jus cogens.  
 
While self-determination and decolonisation may be considered as coterminous, self-
determination can more accurately be described as the umbrella term that captures the 
                                                          
62 See Communique 2017 (n 55) 
63 For an introduction to Dependency Theory see (n 15)  49-52 
64 D Thürer and T Burri, ‘Self-Determination’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law  (OUP 
2008)  <http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e873>; 
See also A Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Perspective (CUP 1995)  
65 Both instruments were adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General 
Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976, 
66 I.C.J., Advisory Opinion, 1971, I.C.J. Rep 16 
67 [1975] ICJ Rep 12 
68 Statement by the UK’s representative in the Security Council on 25 May 1982 (1983) 54 BYBIL 371-371 
69 See (n 64) 140 
different modus operandi of decolonisation. Resolution 1541(XV) recognised the three 
different modus operandi of decolonisation, which is each examples of self-
determination- free association, integration and independence. In October 1970, the UN 
General Assembly adopted Resolution 2625(XXV),70 which reaffirmed the three 
conventional categories for decolonisation but importantly added the possibility that 
‘the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute 
modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.’ This ‘fourth 
option’71 has opened up the possibilities of decolonisation beyond the three categories 
in Resolution 1514(XV), including the provision for a closer relationship with the 
metropolitan power,72 presenting ‘more flexible options set out in Resolution 
1541(XV)’.73  
 
As stated earlier, despite the UK’s expressed policy commitments to self-determination, 
ten out of the fourteen BOTs are on the UN’s List of Non-Self-Governing Territories and 
have been so since 1946. They are therefore the target of decolonisation efforts and, 
under article 73(e) UN Charter, the UK is obliged to submit reports to the UN Secretariat 
on the economic, social and political configurations of the listed territories. Indeed, 
according to Minty’s popular classification of colonies, many of the BOTs maybe likened 
to ‘colonies which possess responsible government subject to a reservation of certain 
matters for the legislation of the Imperial Government’. 74 This is particularly telling in 
reconciling high levels of self-government under and colonial governance structure- 
something which we later refer back to. 
 
While it prima facie appears that the BOTs are colonies according to the United Nations 
(and as will be later discussed, UK domestic law), the constitutional, political and 
economic realities among some of the BOTs reveal a complexity that counters an over 
reductionist picture of territories under the yoke of brutal and imperial impositions.  
Therefore, a normative assessment of the claim that they are colonies requires a method 
of analysis that unravels this complexity.   
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III. The persistence of the colonial – A conceptual framework 
The phenomenon of the continuity or persistence of colonial and imperial power is a 
strand of post-colonial theory,75 which describes how the effects of colonialism have 
become an inseparable part of the current cultural, legal, educational, and political 
institutions. This is an umbrella term that attempts to describe the structural 
continuities between the colonial and postcolony. This persistence, or ‘postcolonial 
melancholia’,76 frames contemporary political and economic matters within the context 
of imperial relations, either as continuations or rearticulating imperial power. Drawing 
from the work of Fanon for example, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o criticises the cultural 
dominance of former settler-colonial powers in the post-colonial nation-state, stressing 
the need for resistance to the imperial residues of language and educational 
infrastructure by ‘moving the centre’.77 Development and Dependency Theory,78  make 
the claim that the restructuring of the global economic system imposed economic 
reforms on post-colonial states that merely reshaped colonial relations of subjugation.79  
One popular articulation of this type of persistence of the colonial was by Kwame 
Nkrumah,80 a leading pan-Africanist, anti-colonial activist and the first president of 
Ghana who coined the term neo-colonialism. While acknowledging the legal cessation of 
imperial power, Nkrumah shrewdly anticipated how newly emerging hegemonic 
powers, such as the United States, would be able to exercise decisive economic and 
monetary and fiscal control through supra-national organisations such as the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation, or 
through foreign aid dependency. He considered this a far more insidious matrix of 
power given the lack of a settler colonizer (the absence of which would suggest the end 
of imperial power). Wing-sang Law similarly observed ‘how colonial power exists and 
operates as an impersonal force through a multiplicity of sites and channels, through 
which the impersonal force may still linger in the absence of a discernible colonizer.’81  
 
In the field of legal scholarship, the persistence of colonialism, sometimes known as 
colonial continuity or inheritance,82 has been used when thematising the different 
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strands of an emerging coherent body of post-colonial legal thought.83 It similarly 
explicated the structural continuities between the imperial power of antiquity and the 
post-colonial state.84  Nathaniel Berman famously illustrated similar concern in the 
context of international law.85 Berman challenged the idea of a ‘Westphalian Break’ 
which began in ‘1648: the break between empire and law’.86 In traditional international 
law discourse, the ‘Westphalian Break’ is the starting point from which modern 
international lawyers chart the beginning of the end of warring empires and the 
ascendency of sovereign states and the triumph of Enlightenment values (reason, order, 
sovereign equality) over those of the so-called Dark Ages (religion, hierarchy, tribalism). 
The creation of the nation state and sovereign equality presaged a break or critical 
juncture from the imperial age and reached its apogee with the creation of the UN 
Charter.  
 
Berman argued that the Westphalian Break is deliberately selective. The ‘claim of an 
historical break can only work if you treat imperialism as a single phenomenon that 
disappears with the death of specific players and legal forms. But decolonisation was 
only the end of a specific form of imperial domination’.87 Thus, focussing on doctrinal or 
institutional changes, ‘while disregarding structural continuity, allows us to think we 
move “from sovereignty to community”.’88 Berman directs part of his criticism at the UN 
trusteeship and mandate system.89 He further argues that failure to pay attention to 
‘structural continuities’ leads to our overestimation ‘the extent to which Mandates and 
Trusteeships broke with imperial domination.’90 The victory of sovereignty was not 
separate from imperial domination but ‘acquired its character through the colonial 
encounter’.91  
 
The persistence of colonial constitutionalism  
In the same way that Berman talks about international law and the UN wittingly or 
unwittingly lending itself to the designs of colonialism, there is in the circumstance of 
BOTs, the persistence of colonial constitutionalism. The idea of the persistence of 
colonial constitutionalism may be likened to the sense in which Chaterjee describes 
post-colonial legalism as ‘the extent to which a set of precommitted foundational laws 
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bind the transformative acts of the new regime’.92 Laws and legal systems continue to 
be used as an instrument of control in the post-colonial milieu.93 Specifically, this 
framework begins to identify the persistence of provisions of colonial governance in the 
different constitutions of the BOTs drawing from archival, scholarly and legal materials.  
The persistence of colonial constitutionalism refers to the structural continuities of 
colonial constitutional provisions from the colonial era into the postcolony, using 
Labour’s ’99 White Paper, with its exaltations of self-determination, as the ‘temporal 
marker’ from which to distinguish the contemporary period from the period of British 
imperial governance. Provisions of colonial governance refer to laws or conventions 
that enable the United Kingdom to intervene in the domestic and external affairs of its 
overseas territories. It must also be added that the exercise of such interventions can 
vary as to their content- from the practically conscientious, whereby the UK will consult 
the locally elected government in the exercise of ‘colonial laws’, to the malignant, such 
was the case in the British Indian Ocean Territory.   
The framework is modest in its articulation, predicating itself only on a conception of 
colonial and imperial power that concerns itself with constitutional provisions rather 
than the multiplicity of sites and channels through which colonial power may 
materialise94 and, as mentioned earlier, how the BOTs service British power in the 
world. Thus, it does not focus on those issues concomitant at the international law level 
or those concerning political economy which implicates neo-colonialism in the nature of 
Nkrumah’s analyses. The strength of this conceptual analysis, ‘the persistence of 
colonial constitutionalism’, ‘lies not in its historical foundations, but in its enormous 
potential as a set of theoretical and methodological tools for deconstructing the colonial 
foundations of contemporary power structures’.95 As a prolegomenon, this analysis 
reveals the subtle and elusive expressions of colonial power that are often obscured by 
policies and provisions that proclaim greater self-determination. 
  
IV. Between self-government and colonial governance: BOTs’ constitutionalism 
and the persistence analysis 
This section first begins by looking at the judicial cognizance of the question whether 
BOTs are continuations of former colonies. This was addressed in Lord Hoffman’s 
common law test of ‘new political entities’ in Bancoult (No 2) and invited recent 
introspection in the Bashir litigation. Following this, the section identifies some of the 
typical provisions of colonial governance in the BOTs and charts their historical 
development in Gibraltar96 and elsewhere they persist in other BOTs.  
                                                          
92 P Chaterjee, ‘Postcolonial Legalism’ (2014) 34, 2 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the 
Middle East 225 
93 See (n 14) 319; See also R Cooper, ‘The Post Modern State’ (The Foreign Policy Centre, September 15 
2006) available at < https://fpc.org.uk/the-post-modern-state/>  
94 See (n 81) 
95 See (n 14) 342 
96 The reasons for the focus upon Gibraltar are explained elsewhere. See later Colonial Governance: 
Provisions illustrating The Persistence of Colonial Constitutionalism in the BOTs 
 BOTs, colonies and the courts 
The question of whether BOTs are political continuations of the colonies that preceded 
them has been considered in both Bancoult (No 2),97 with the ‘new political entity test’ 
established by Lord Hoffman, and the Bashir litigation.98 The facts of Bancoult (No 2) 
have been well rehearsed elsewhere,99 but involved the forced expulsion of the 
Chagossians from the BOT known as the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). The 
BIOT was formed from the Chagos Archipelago, situated in the middle of the Indian 
Ocean, along with Mauritius and was ceded by France to Great Britain in 1814. The 
Archipelago was governed until 1965 as part of the British colony of Mauritius though 
Mauritius was some 1000 miles away from the main collection of Islands. The biggest of 
the Islands, Diego Garcia, had been home to the Chagossians for some 200 years. With 
Mauritius independence looming in 1965, the British government separated it from the 
archipelago (including Diego Garcia), with the former creating the BIOT. The core issue 
in the litigation was the legality of the expulsion of the Chagossians by the UK when it 
leased parts of the BIOT to the United States for military purposes. Part of the 
submissions made was  whether a declaration made in 1953 to extend the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to the Colony of Mauritius (the antecedent to the 
BIOT), carried on to the BIOT in 1965. Lord Hoffman ruled that it did not, arguing that 
such an international obligation only attaches to a ‘political entity’ or a state and not to 
the land of the territory. Where a part of a territory has been reconstituted into a new 
political entity, existing legal obligations do not attach to that new entity. Following the 
independence of Mauritius and the excision of the BIOT,100 the BIOT constituted a 
distinct, new political entity and thus, the ECHR no longer applied there.101  
 
Most recently, the application of this test formed the basis of litigation in another BOT, 
the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs).102 The question was whether the Refugee Convention, 
which was extended to the Colony of Cyprus, extended to  the SBAs which had been  
part of the Colony of Cyprus before the creation of the now Republic of Cyprus. In a 
judicial review in the SBA Senior Judges’ Court (SBA court),103 Collender J looked at the 
Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus104 and the enabling UK statute, the 
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Cyprus Act 1960105 and concluded the SBAs were not a new political entity 
distinguishable from the former Colony of Cyprus and resultantly, the Refugee 
Convention did apply to it. He stated that such a question could not be answered ‘by 
changes in nomenclature or administrative changes but the origins and nature of the 
political entity’. Collender J made important factual distinctions with Bancoult (No2)106 
in that the SBAs were remnants of the land that now constituted the Republic of Cyprus. 
However, Rumbelow and Whitburn JJ in the majority concluded that the SBAs were new 
political entities, each given a new system of government107 as well as ‘fundamental 
changes in the purpose, nature and governance of the SBAs from those operating within 
the old colony’108 (including harmonisation of laws with the new Republic of Cyprus). In 
an appeal in the SBA court, that court unanimously upheld the decision of the lower 
court, stating that looking at relevant documents, the SBAs were new political 
entities.109  
 
In a further appeal to the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, again in a unanimous 
decision, Lord Irwin (with Lord Justices Jackson and Briggs) stated that the ‘new 
political entity’ test was not easy in its application.110 A territory may undergo 
substantial internal change with its metropolitan power not shedding its obligations for 
it under international law.111 Interestingly, Lord Irwin noted the post-hearing 
submissions of the Secretary of State that the colonial institutions of the Colony of 
Cyprus (Executive Council, Village Commissions, and Municipal Corporations) no longer 
existed, but clarified that these were not markers of a different political entity.112 Lord 
Irwin held that the legal context was the most important consideration and that despite 
the significant changes in the size and internal arrangements of the SBAs, they were 
‘constitutionally and politically… a continuation of what had gone before’ and thus were 
fundamentally different from the BIOT.113 As a result, the UK’s obligations under the 
Refugee Convention continued.114 This was recently affirmed in 2018 by the UK 
Supreme Court.115 
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There are several important points to take from this judgment. The first is that Lord 
Hoffman’s test is not presumed to have been defeated in the face of the metropolitan’s 
continuing obligations for the territory under international law.116 Second, new political 
institutions do not amount to satisfaction of the test. As Lord Irwin stated ‘even very 
major constitutional or political changes cannot be said automatically to create a new 
political entity.’117 The majority and minority rulings in the SBA Senior Judges Court 
were arguably analogous but focussed on different facts that produced different 
conclusions. Thirdly, and perhaps most relevantly, the judgment appears to be a tacit 
admission that colonial governance structures persist in at least some of the BOTs and 
demonstrates the UK courts’ willingness, albeit indirectly, to deal with the question of 
whether BOTs are modern day colonies.  
 
Colonial Governance: Provisions illustrating the persistence of colonial 
constitutionalism in the BOTs  
Identifying the persistence of colonial constitutionalism involves tracking specific 
markers in constitutional developments in the BOTS from the imperial era to the post-
colonial period to consider whether they further the design of colonial governance. 
There are several types of constitutional provisions and conventions that demonstrate 
colonial governance. In other words, they enable the United Kingdom to intervene in the 
domestic and external affairs of its overseas territories. While the following is not an 
exhaustive list,118 they identify some of the archetypal provisions of colonial 
constitutional intervention.  
 
As this is only intended as an inauguration of post-colonial constitutional theory as 
applied to BOTs, there is a concentrated focus on Gibraltar and the historical 
development of such types of provisions in the territory, with occasional references to 
other territories. Among the fourteen BOTs, Gibraltar is the only one that is a member of 
the European Union and exhibits- perhaps beside some of the Caribbean-based BOTs- 
one of the highest-levels of self-government and financial independence. It is one of only 
two European BOTs and so intuitively, appears to be anathema to the notion of a post-
colonial Europe (which undertook rapid decolonisation in the 1940s, 50s and 60s). 
Further, notwithstanding their desire for greater constitutional reform, elected officials 
in Gibraltar have often strongly contested at the United Nations that the territory is 
governed by a colonial relationship. In this vein, after the passing of United Nations 
General Assembly Resolution 1541(XV),119 a former Chief Minister of Gibraltar, Joshua 
Hassan, emphasised that the relationship between the UK and Gibraltar was not a 
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colonial one.120 Over the years, Gibraltar has made persistent representations at the UN 
to secure recognition of its right to self-determination.121 Indeed, it has a high GDP, a 
diverse economy and the scope of ministerial powers is broad. Moreover, political 
conventions mean that, despite not being able to commence, negotiate and conclude 
international treaties, the UK will typically consult Gibraltar on such matters.122 
However, the provisions of colonial governance, as evidence of the persistence of 
colonial constitutionalism, are prevalent in all BOT constitutions and have endured 
since the time of their initial acquisition by Great Britain.  
 
Powers of the monarch: Prerogative instruments, POGG powers, disallowance and royal 
assent  
 
The powers of the Monarch in the BOTs are a major mode of colonial governance which 
demonstrates the persistence of the colonial. They are manifested in a series of 
prerogative instruments - in particular, the Peace, Order and Good Government 
(POGG)123 provisions - the powers to disallow local legislation, the power of the 
Governor to reserve bills ‘for HM signification’, and various land acquisition powers.  
 
Firstly, it is important to briefly outline how the Monarch’s powers operate over their 
territories. In the BOTs, HM would retain general legislative and executive powers to act 
for those territories through the Royal Prerogative. However, if the Royal Prerogative is 
used to establish a representative assembly,124 such general legislative power is 
displaced, unless that power is then expressly reserved.125  This is the case for instance, 
in eight out of the fourteen BOTs,126 which have representative assemblies. The Royal 
Prerogative can be used to issue a range of different types of prerogative instruments. 
These may include proclamations, letters patent or Royal Instructions issued to the 
Governor to perform a particular set of tasks. However, the obligation upon the 
Governor to exercise the powers of his office in accordance with instructions issued by 
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her Majesty127 persists till today.128 Bermuda129 and Pitcairn Islands130 for example, 
provide for the Governor to act subject to such instructions as maybe issued by HM.  
 
The royal prerogative and the peace, order and good government power 
The ‘peace, order and good government’ (POGG) power is a major expression of the 
prerogative powers enshrined in the constitutions of the BOTs. The POGG powers are as 
old as British colonialisation efforts131 and are constitutional provisions that confer 
large, plenary legislative powers on the grantee.132 As the House of Lords affirmed in 
Bancoult No. 2,133  
 
the POGG power is equal in scope to the legislative power of Parliament … it is 
not open to the courts to hold that legislation enacted under a power described 
in those terms does not, in fact, conduce to the peace, order and good 
government of the territory.134   
 
The POGG powers have a chequered history in Gibraltar. They first appeared in 1830 
with the issuing of the Fifth Charter of Justice135 which effectively gave the Crown 
exclusive legislative powers which were to be exercised on the ‘advice and consent’ of 
the Westminster Parliament, HM Privy Council or the Governor of Gibraltar.136 The 
POGG power also appeared in Letters Patent issued in 1910.137 Here, the power was 
bifurcated between the Governor, who exercised the primary ‘day-to-day’ POGG powers 
(‘primary POGG’), and residual or reserve POGG powers apportioned to the Crown (‘HM 
residual POGG’) with accompanying Royal Instructions138 setting limitations on the 
exercise of the Governor’s POGG powers.  
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The bifurcation of the POGG power persisted in the Gibraltar (Legislative Council) Order 
in Council 1950. However, there were two important changes to the primary POGG 
power. First, the establishment of a newly created Legislative Council meant the 
Governor lost exclusivity. Instead, the power had to be exercised on the ‘advice and 
consent’ of the partially elected Legislative Council, a moderate concession to self-
government. Second, the drafters built in a contingency provision into the primary 
POGG power139 in providing the Governor with a reserve power to enact bills in the 
‘interests of peace, order and good government’ should the Legislative Council fail to do 
so. Though this came attached with an obligation to notify the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies and members of the Council could voice objections, it fundamentally gave the 
governor (as the representative of the Crown)  considerably wide legislative scope to 
usurp the power of the legislative council.140 This bifurcation followed the line of classic 
colonial constitutional law described by Keith thus: 
The wide power of the Crown to create constitutions has resulted in the 
existence for the vast majority of existing colonies of a double power. The 
constitution recognises the necessity of, and provides a local legislature, but at 
the same time the right of the Crown to legislate by Order in Council is asserted. 
Such legislation may be used to enact some measures which it would be difficult 
to pass through the local legislature without raising undue resentment, or merely 
for some ground of convenience141  
 
In the 1969 Constitution, the newly created Legislature exercised the primary POGG 
power but this consisted of ‘the Governor and the Assembly.’142 Further, the exercise of 
the primary POGG power was still ‘subject to the provisions of the constitution’. In 2006, 
the primary POGG and HM residual POGG remained largely unchanged from the 1969 
Constitution except that ‘the Legislature’ had been redefined to ‘consist of Her Majesty 
and the Gibraltar Parliament’.143 This means the Governor is no longer constitutionally a 
part of the newly named legislature presaging a greater advance toward self-
government. However, unusually, a new, third POGG-related contingency power is given 
to the Governor to withhold assent or reserve bills for the signification of HM’s pleasure 
if they are repugnant to ‘good government’.144  
Further, a fourth POGG power is established under s.38(3) allowing the Governor to 
ignore the advice of the Chief Minister to dissolve Parliament or do so in the absence of 
such advice ‘if he considers that the good government of Gibraltar requires him to do 
so.’ Given the manner in which this has been judicially interpreted- to give the 
appointee plenary powers- this opens up the possibility of the Governor to dissolve the 
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Gibraltar Parliament for a potentially broad and wide-ranging number of reasons. 
Further, and perhaps most importantly, all these observations must be coupled with the 
fact that the most enduring feature of Gibraltarian constitutionalism is, without 
question, HM residual POGG power; the pristine form of colonial governance,145 which 
has persisted largely unchanged from 1830. The nature of reform therefore, may be 
likened to constitutional somersaulting whereby concurrent advances in self-
government are undermined by constitutional provisions of colonial governance. This 
tension, symptomatic of BOT constitutional reform across the board, is well captured 
thus: 
 
there arose as elsewhere in the British Empire a tension between good 
government and self-government, between authoritative and paternalistic 
administration according to the standards, expectations and goals of those in 
imperial authority on the one hand and the perceptions, interests and indeed 
self-interests of the civilian population on the other146 
 
Constantine’s observations here reflect the core issue with the governance and status of 
the BOTs in how they illustrate the persistence of the colonial.  
Moreover, HM reserve POGG powers exist in every single constitution of the BOTs 
except for Bermuda which only has a primary POGG power that underwrites the 
legislative power of its Parliament.147  The use of the reserve POGG powers have also 
been the source of much litigation. For example, in the Turks and Caicos Islands, HM 
reserve POGG powers148 were used by the UK government to exercise direct rule, 
through the Governor, after allegations of corruption levelled by the Auld Report.149 
Challenges to the legality of HM POGG began on behalf of the former Premier of the 
Turks and Caicos, pending implementation of one of the recommendations of the report.  
In R (on the Application of Misick) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Common Wealth 
Affairs,150 the former Premier sought permission for judicial review pertaining to the 
legality of the Turks and Caicos Islands Constitution (Interim Amendment) Order 2009151 
(2009 Order). This would have the effect of temporarily suspending parts of the 
Territory’s constitution, including removing the right to trial by jury, enshrined in s.6 
(g) of the Turks and Caicos 2006 Constitution and replacing the representative 
government by a system of direct administration by the Governor of the territory. 
Indeed, the UK government used this power of direct rule on Turks and Caicos from 
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West Indies Act 1962 (which also provided the basis for the territory’s constitution).  
Similarly, HM POGG powers were at the centre of the Bancoult litigation following the 
forced expulsion of the Chagossians in Diego Garcia. This expulsion was done under the 
Immigration Ordinance 1971 made by the Commissioner purportedly acting under 
powers conferred on him to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the 
BIOT.152  
 
Disallowance of, and assent to legislation 
In addition, the Crown also has the power of disallowance that enables it to nullify 
locally enacted legislation. This is a significant colonial governance mechanism though it 
is used rarely and, ostensibly, exists primarily to disincentivise objectionable local laws 
such as those which may be unconstitutional or those that might undermine 
international obligations. 153  Gibraltar once again is an interesting case among the BOTs 
on this issue. It has had powers of disallowance codified in its various constitutional 
instruments since antiquity including s.24 Gibraltar (Legislative Council) Order 1950 
and s.37, 1969 Constitution. However, in the 1999 consultation, the Gibraltar Assembly’s 
Select Committee on Constitutional Reform suggested the removal of this provision.154 
Now, Gibraltar stands as the only BOT among the fourteen where the Crown has no 
power of disallowance- a significant advancement toward self-government.  
 
In the Bermudian constitution, the powers of disallowance are uniquely narrow.155 
Nonetheless, a typical disallowance provision in the other BOTs’ constitutions, say for 
example in the BIOT156 or St Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha,157 confers power 
on the Crown to disallow any law which the Governor has assented to and the notice of 
disallowance - significant for the courts - comes into effect the moment it is published in 
the Gazette. Note here how the justification for the disallowance powers speaks to the 
persistence of colonial constitutionalism, namely that the peoples of the BOTs are 
perceived to lack the maturity to be entrusted with their own affairs, even in the context 
of a democratic polity. The propriety of this justification can only stand in the context of 
imperial paternalism that substantially foregrounded the colonial enterprise from 
centuries ago.  
Relatedly, each territory with a legislative assembly will require assent by or on behalf 
of HM. However, there are variations among the BOTs that outline the circumstances in 
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which the Governor may give or withhold assent or the instances in which they may or 
must reserve a bill ‘for the signification of Her Majesty’s pleasure.’ This stock phrase 
requires bills to be sent to London for assent by HM on the advice of her UK government 
ministers (rather than those of the territory). In Gibraltar’s current 2006 Constitution 
for example, the Governor may only reserve assent for HM signification if a bill appears 
to be ‘repugnant to or inconsistent with the constitution’158 and may only withhold 
assent, if it is incompatible with any international legal obligation or repugnant to good 
government159- though the latter, as a lexical variation of POGG powers, may have 
plenary scope.160 This situation is in contrast to that in the British Virgin Islands where, 
for example, the Governor has no power to withhold assent but only a limited choice of 
assent or reservation for HM signification in certain scenarios.161 Still, whether it is the 
former or the latter of these variations, the presence of these provisions emphasises the 
persistence of the colonial in the political, social and legal structures of governance in 
the BOTs.  
 
The role of the Governor  
The existence of the office of Governors162 and more fundamentally, their powers, is a 
clear signifier of the persistence of colonial constitutionalism in the BOTs. Governors 
serve as the Crown’s representative and head of government in the Territories, and are 
significant vestiges of colonial governance. Though Governors may be considered to 
wear two hats- as a voice of the territory to the UK government and as the Crown’s 
representative in the territory- constitutionally, their role is very much the latter. Given 
that their office flows from its position as representative of the Queen, the Governor is 
the head of government of the BOT,163 and generally exercises varying levels of both 
executive164 and legislative functions.  
 
Governors’ executive powers 
Commonly, Governors’ executive functions include responsibility for external affairs, 
defence, internal security and responsibility for the public service, assignment of 
responsibilities of local Ministers, proroguing powers, powers of appointment, and 
powers to constitute offices, powers of pardon, powers to dispose of Crown Land and 
emergency powers among others. In BOTs with permanent populations, the tendency is 
for the Governor to share powers with the local executive and legislative institutions. In 
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BOTs with no permanent population (and thus in the absence of any locally elected 
governmental body), the Governor (or Commissioner/Administrator) will effectively165 
be the principal executive authority. For example, in the BIOT, the Commissioner has 
exclusive executive powers.166 Similarly, the Commissioner in the British Antarctic 
Territory has exclusive executive authority.167 In the Pitcairn Islands, with a population 
of around 50 and which does have an elected Island Council168, the Governor exercises 
executive authority on behalf of the Crown.169  
 
The demands for self-determination by peoples of various BOTs as well as the UK 
government’s declared policy recognising the legitimacy of such demands has led to 
significant changes in the Governors powers compared with those during the colonial 
period. Still, a careful examination of the changes demonstrates the persistence of 
colonial constitutionalism. This is particularly evident in Gibraltar despite significant 
changes in the local governance. Indeed, the Gibraltar experience is arguably a poignant 
representation of Lord Irwin’s view in the Bashir case170 (stated earlier) that even major 
constitutional or political changes do not automatically create a new political entity. 
Primary executive power was vested in the Governor in its 1969 constitution171 though 
the partially elected Gibraltar Council172 were consulted in the formation of policy, with 
several broad exemptions.173 Further, the Governor was obliged to act in accordance 
with the advice of a locally elected body - effectively a quasi-government- called the 
Council of Ministers174 in defined domestic matters,175 albeit with copious exceptions.176  
 
The circumscription of the powers of the Council of Ministers as ‘defined domestic 
matters’ was scrapped in the 2006 Constitution. Instead, the Constitution outlines the 
Governor’s executive powers under ‘Special Responsibilities’177 which includes external 
affairs, defence, internal security and such functions relating to public appointments.  
These powers must be exercised in consultation with the Chief Minister ‘as far as is 
practicable’. Positive though this is, to all intents and purposes, the Government of 
Gibraltar still has no constitutionally recognised right to conduct executive affairs which 
fall under the Governor’s ‘Special Responsibilities’. In other words, though this creates 
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an obligation to consult the Chief Minister on such a broad range of governance issues, 
the Governor is not obliged to accept or implement the outcome of such consultation. It 
is important to keep in mind that these powers include negotiating international 
treaties and control of the police force which are significant  
 
The persistence of the colonial in this regard is even more marked in Bermuda. The 
Bermuda Constitution178 does not obligate the Governor to either consult or act in 
accordance with advice from the Cabinet or minister in relation to external affairs179 
though it does provide the Governor with a discretionary power to delegate special 
responsibilities, including external affairs, to the Premier or other minister.180 Even if, 
as Hendry and Dickson point out, the practice has been that of partial delegation of 
those powers,181 the critical point is that the Governor is under no obligation to do so 
and thus, unlike the Gibraltar situation, a case cannot be sustained for even the need for 
consultation. The practice is mostly then a matter of the Governor’s political preferences 
(and by direct extension, the UK government) rather than a matter of constitutional 
obligation that advances self-government in that BOT.  
 
 
Furthermore, in relation to the external affairs component of the Special 
Responsibilities of the Governor, the picture is rather different in some of the other 
BOTs. While leaving overall responsibility for external affairs to the Governor, there are 
constitutional provisions that involve locally elected ministers in the exercise of these 
powers. The Constitutions of the British Virgin Islands (BVI), Montserrat and Cayman 
Islands provide for even greater degrees of devolved responsibility pertaining to 
external affairs. Thus, there is a mandatory requirement for the Governor to delegate 
responsibility to ministers for the conduct of external affairs that fall within their 
portfolios in the BVI,182 Cayman Islands183 and Montserrat.184 In addition, in the Cayman 
Islands, the Governor is obliged to consult the Cabinet in the exercise of external affairs 
insofar as it is reasonably practicable to do so and unless the matter is not materially 
significant such as to require consultation.185 This ordinarily makes the provisions 
similar to that of Gibraltar. However, virtually uniquely, the Governor cannot 
commence, negotiate or approve a treaty or any international agreement that would 
affect internal policy or require implementing legislation without obtaining the 
agreement of the cabinet, unless instructed otherwise by the Secretary of State.186  Thus, 
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the external affairs provisions provide an interesting focal point to observe the tensions 
between persistent colonial governance and the advance toward self-government. 187    
 
Governors’ legislative powers 
The delineation of the Governor’s legislative powers, like the executive powers, are also 
contingent on whether there are locally elected ministers or not and, relatedly, whether 
the BOT has a permanent or substantial population. In six out of the fourteen BOTs,188 
the Governor or variations thereof189 are the principal legislative authority with varying 
obligations to consult, though not necessarily to follow, a local quasi-
legislature/executive body.190 These BOTs are those with either no permanent 
population or where the population is not substantial.   
 
In those BOTs with a substantial population, there are variations too of the legislative 
powers of the Governor. The variations notwithstanding, the persistence of colonial 
constitutionalism are evident. Governors may have reserve powers that enable them to 
pass through legislation that may not be passed by the local democratic assembly, 
however defined. In Gibraltar, the Governor previously had plenary legislative 
powers,191 subject only to limitations by the Crown (rather than any domestic 
government or legislature) up until the mid-20th century. However, the introduction of 
the Gibraltar (Legislative Council) Order in Council 1950 required the Governor to make 
laws ‘with the advice and consent of the council’, referring to a newly-created, partially 
democratic legislative assembly into the law making process. Nonetheless, this was 
subject to a reserve power192 that enabled the Governor to enact bills in the ‘interests of 
peace, order and good government’ should the Legislative Council fail to do so. The 
Gibraltar Constitution Order 1969 subsequently removed this reserve power. The 
exercise of the newly formed Legislature’s193 law-making power however, was still 
‘subject to the provisions of the constitution’. This included the Crown’s powers of 
disallowing legislation194 the Governor’s powers of withholding assent or reserving 
signification of bills for Her Majesty (HM)195; and the Governor’s exclusive legislative 
power for matters outside ‘defined domestic matters’.196  
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Further, despite not having a blanket reserve power, the Governor could enact bills 
outside ‘defined domestic matters’197 if it was unlikely to be passed by the Assembly or 
introduced by the Gibraltar Council198 or in a limited number of areas within defined 
domestic matters in the interests of the ‘financial and economic stability of Gibraltar’.199 
Relatedly, an ouster clause precluded the possibility of review by the courts on ‘any 
question whether a matter is a defined domestic matter’ thus protecting imperial 
interests by empowering the Governor to have the final say.200  
Therefore, while advances toward self-government were made in some respects by 
partially devolving the Governor’s legislative powers in Gibraltar, there were several 
imperial contingencies that ensured stop-gap measures for the Governor and, by 
extension, the UK metropole to maintain power. In the Gibraltar Constitution Order 
2006, the Governor was removed from the Legislature, and the categorisation of defined 
domestic matters for law-making was removed. However, in a somersault that 
demonstrates again the persistence of colonial constitutionalism, the Governor was 
given the power to withhold assent or reserve bills for the signification of HM’s pleasure 
if they were repugnant to ‘good government’.201 Similarly, in Anguilla, the Cayman 
Islands, and the Falkland Islands, their constitutions also provide the Governor with a 
reserve legislative power which may be invoked to enact a bill in prescribed areas or to 
push through bills they anticipate won’t be passed by the local legislature.202  
 
The persistence of colonial constitutionalism framework of analyses reveals a spectrum 
of coloniality which discloses varying degrees of executive and legislative power 
exercised by the Governor (and de facto the metropolitan centre). Some BOTs evince 
greater advancement toward self-determination and self-rule, while others are 
governed almost entirely by the UK metropole through the Governor.  
 
Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 and the Interpretation Act 1978 
As will become clear, it remains striking that the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (CLVA) 
and the Interpretation Act 1978 have not been amended or even repealed altogether 
given their legal definitions that essentially class BOTs as colonies. These two important 
pieces of colonial legislations ought at least to have been amended since 1999 when the 
government formally set into motion its policy of self-determination for the BOTs and at 
the latest, by 2002 when the British Overseas Territories Act was enacted. Specifically, 
considering its visibility in the arguments of the UK government in two important 
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recent cases involving BOTs; Bancoult No.2 and Misick203 it is telling that the 
government has proceeded with its declared policy of ‘partnership’ and commitment to 
self-governance and self-determination in the BOTs without efforts to repeal the CLVA 
as a whole or at least certain parts of it as well as Schedule I of the Interpretation Act 
1978.  
The common constitutional provisions of all fourteen BOTs, such as the unlimited 
power of the UK Parliament to legislate for the BOTs, and the UK’s overall responsibility 
for their external affairs, effectively class them as colonies under Schedule 1, 
Interpretation Act 1978. The Interpretation Act provides that ‘colony’ means   
 
 any part of Her Majesty’s dominions outside the British Islands 
except…territories for whose external relations a country other than the United 
Kingdom is responsible…and where parts of such dominions are under both a 
central and a local legislature, all parts under the central legislature are deemed 
for the purposes of this definition to be one colony204 
  
Similarly, the CLVA would deem the BOTs as colonies despite the nomenclatural change 
from ‘dependent territories’205 because Section 1 provides that  
 
The term colony shall in this Act include all of Her Majesty’s possessions abroad 
in which there shall exist a legislature as hereinafter defined except the Channel 
Islands and the Isle of Man…the term ‘legislature’ shall…signify the authority 
other than Imperial Parliament or Her Majesty in Council, competent to make 
Laws for any colony. 
 
Further, Section 1 of the Act also defines ‘colonial law’ as laws made for any colony 
either by a colonial legislature206 or by Her Majesty in Council.207 Section 2 states that 
colonial laws are subject to the ‘repugnancy doctrine’. The repugnancy doctrine means 
‘colonial laws’ so-defined are void and inoperative if they are counter to any 
Westminster Act of Parliament which extends to the BOTs, either expressly or by 
necessary intendment.208 For the purposes of the CLVA therefore, all local laws (as 
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colonial laws) made by the Legislatures of the BOTs are vulnerable to the repugnancy 
doctrine.  
Importantly, Gibraltar and BIOT, who have Prerogative Orders in Council, rather than a 
Westminster Act of Parliament, as the legal bases of their constitutions (as is the case 
with the other twelve BOTs), are also considered colonial laws. This means their 
constitutions are vulnerable to the repugnancy doctrine and are only superior to local 
laws as a matter of statutory construction, namely that judges in the domestic 
jurisdictions will interpret provisions of the constitution as such. Contrastingly, the 
constitutions of the other twelve BOTs, whose legal bases are Westminster Acts of 
Parliament, are not colonial laws vis-à-vis Section 1 CLVA, are immune to the 
repugnancy doctrine, and importantly, are  supreme over local laws. However, while 
this may seem like a qualitative distinction, it must be noted that the 12 BOTs whose 
constitutions are superior over local laws are only so by virtue of what is foundationally 
an imperial imposition by the Westminster Parliament. In other words, the supremacy 
of these constitutions derives from the UK rather from the domestic constitutional 
principles of sovereignty or supremacy; a classic case of the persistence of colonial 
constitutionalism.  
 
BOTs and Westminster Parliament’s Legislative Supremacy  
Another of the multiple mechanisms of colonial governance is the UK Parliament’s 
legislative supremacy, which also extends to all BOTs and provides Westminster with 
unlimited power to make laws for them.209 Indeed, ‘there is no such thing as an illegal 
act of the Imperial Parliament; its power of legislation is plenary, and its edicts must be 
enforced in every court of law throughout the British Dominions, Possessions, and 
Protectorates’.210 In contemporary practice, Acts of Parliament will often explicitly 
extend to the BOTs but will sometimes apply through necessary intendment. As stated 
earlier, the recent Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, is a model reference 
point in this issue. A longstanding example is the equally controversial Colonial 
Prisoners Removal Act 1884 which requires the BOTs to extradite convicted criminals to 
the UK at their request to serve their sentences which was in fact used as recently as 
2017.211 As is typically the case however, UK Acts of Parliament will usually confer 
power on a UK Government Minister to legislate for the BOT through an Order in 
Council.212 One particularly telling example is the Emergency Powers (Overseas 
Territories) Order 2017213 made in exercise of several Acts of Parliament.214 This 
provides the Governor or equivalent administrator of the nine of the BOTs with broad 
intrusive powers which include proclaiming a public emergency and the ability to make 
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regulations to restore order that range from detaining individuals,215 requisitioning 
civilian property216 to limiting the free movement of its inhabitants.217  
Moreover, there is no constitutional obligation upon the UK Parliament to consult the 
BOTs, though ‘consultation is normally undertaken where practicable’ on laws that 
extend to them. Indeed, there is a general reluctance to use Westminster Acts of 
Parliaments to legislate on certain issues in the BOTs.218 Fundamentally however, 
though there may be a reluctance to legislate for the territories through Westminster 
Acts of Parliament - along with a convention of consultation with the BOTs if they do so 
-, the principal criticism with this governance mechanism is, to put it mildly, a  
‘democratic deficit’. BOTs are not constitutionally a part of the UK and have no 
representation in the Westminster Parliament. They are therefore subject to laws over 
which they have no constitutionally recognised role in. This is another enduring feature 
of colonial governance that has persisted since antiquity.  
 
V. Conclusion 
The persistence thesis drawn from post-colonial legal theory is a veritable tool for 
unravelling the descriptive assertions - from both the UK and local territory 
governments- that self-government is the telos of BOT constitutions and constitutional 
reform. What it begins to reveal is that something gets lost in the worthwhile pursuit of 
self-determination; something this article’s analysis tries to find. The persistent and 
enduring provisions of colonial governance in these constitutions can often be lost 
among the reforms that advance self-government.  
 
The foregoing analysis is by no means an exhaustive exegesis of the constitutional 
developments and designs of the BOTs. Nonetheless, prima facie, it appears that the 
status of the territories align more closely with the statement made by Oliver Stanley; 
then Secretary of State for the Colonies,219 at the berthing of decolonisation under 
international law in the post-second world war period. This policy statement captures 
the reality of the constitutional developments and governance of the BOTs.  Rather than 
the exaltations of self-determination that have continued to be stated from 1999 in 
successive Government White Papers, through the granting of new constitutions, the 
correct position as to the status of BOTs is arguably not that they have ceased to be 
colonies. Rather, as the foregoing analysis demonstrates, the position is that some are 
more of colonies and others are less so- though paradigmatically, they still operate 
within the structure of colonial governance.  
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 What we have now with regard to the status of the BOTs is a ‘spectrum of coloniality’; a 
persistence of colonial constitutionalism where Bermuda is arguably the least 
constitutionally colonised with Pitcairn Islands, BAT and SBAs at the other end. Other 
notable BOTs such as Gibraltar, Anguilla and Turks and Caicos occupy a space in 
between on the spectrum, though more toward the Bermuda side. As a final word then, 
if it would be properly asserted that the word ‘nuance’ is to be applied in 
constitutionalism, international law and international relations, it should be with 
reference to the status of BOTs.  
 
 
 
